A formula ϕ is called n-provable in a formal arithmetical theory S if ϕ is provable in S together with all true arithmetical Πn-sentences taken as additional axioms. While in general the set of all n-provable formulas, for a fixed n > 0, is not recursively enumerable, the set of formulas ϕ whose n-provability is provable in a given r.e. metatheory T is r.e. This set is deductively closed and will be, in general, an extension of S. We prove that these theories can be naturally axiomatized in terms of progressions of iterated local reflection principles. In particular, the set of provably 1-provable sentences of Peano arithmetic PA can be axiomatized by ε0 times iterated local reflection schema over PA. Our characterizations yield additional information on the proof-theoretic strength of these theories (w.r.t. various measures of it) and on their axiomatizability. We also study the question of speed-up of proofs and show that in some cases a proof of n-provability of a sentence can be much shorter than its proof from iterated reflection principles.
Introduction
A lot of recent work on provability logic and its applications to the analysis of systems of arithmetic involves the notion of n-provability. An arithmetical formula ϕ is called n-provable in a formal theory T whose language contains that of Peano arithmetic if ϕ is provable in T together with all true arithmetical Π n -sentences taken as additional axioms. Another notion of n-provability has also been considered in the literature, where ϕ is called n-provable if ϕ is provable in T using first order logic and one application of the omega-rule stated for Σ n−1 -formulas (cf [17] ). The two notions coincide only for n = 1, however the former is simpler and more useful for applications, so n-provability will only refer to that notion in the present paper.
The set of n-provable formulas of a (sound) r.e. theory T is Σ n+1 -complete and is expressible by an arithmetical Σ n+1 -formula usually denoted [n] T (x). This formula (provably in T ) shares the main properties of the usual Gödel's provability predicate, that is, Löb's derivability conditions, therefore the standard proof of Gödel's second incompleteness theorem also works for n-provability. Hence, if a theory T is n-consistent, its n-consistency is not n-provable.
The sentence ¬[n] T ( ⊥ ) expressing the n-consistency of T is also known to be equivalent to the uniform reflection principle for Σ n -formulas, RFN Σn (T ). This connects the study of nprovability to the theory of transfinite recursive progressions of axiomatic systems based on iteration of reflection principles that originated in the works of Turing [19] and Feferman [8] .
In provability logic, the notion of n-provability emerged in the work of C. Smoryński (see [18] ) who characterized GL as the provability logic of the n-provability predicate. Konstantin Ignatiev [9] , following Giorgi Japaridze [10] , axiomatized the polymodal provability logic GLP of the n-provability predicates taken together for all n ∈ ω.
The notion of n-provability later found several interesting applications in the study of fragments of PA. It was used to characterize the fragments of arithmetic defined by parameter free induction [2] and to study their properties such as complexity of axiomatization, the classes of provably total computable functions, etc. The notion of n-provability and the modal logic GLP also played a prominent role in the approach to the ordinal analysis of systems of arithmetic based on provability algebras [4, 5] .
While the set of all n-provable formulas (for n > 0) is in general not recursively axiomatizable, the set of formulas ϕ for which [n] S ϕ is provable in the ordinary sense in a given (r.e.) metatheory T is a recursively enumerable set. This set is deductively closed and will be, in general, an extension of S (denoted C n S (T ) below). We are interested in obtaining a natural recursive axiomatization of such a theory and to better understand its properties such as how strong it is compared to T and to S and whether it is finitely axiomatizable. For example, what is the theory C 1 PA (PA) ? We notice that C 0 PA (PA) has the same set of theorems as PA. However, by Parikh's theorem there is a non-provably recursive speed-up between PA and C 0 PA (PA). The case n = 0 is an exception, and for all n > 0 the theories C n S (T ) are, in general, strictly stronger than S. The answers that we obtain are formulated in terms of progressions of iterated local reflection principles. For example, we show that C 1 S (PA) is equivalent to ε 0 times iterated local reflection schema over S. More generally, it turns out that the number of times the local reflection schema needs to be iterated to axiomatize the theory C 1 S (T ) is related to the so-called Σ 0 2 -ordinal of T introduced in [6] . We also obtain more general characterizations of theories C n S (T ) for n > 1 in terms of iterations of relativized local reflection principles.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 contains a brief summary of basic notions and the notation used in this paper. In Section 3 we introduce the theories C n S (T ) and prove several basic results related to them. Section 4 is devoted to the axiomatization of the theory C 1 S (EA), which is the base case for our study. In Section 5 we are dealing with the same problem for the extensions of EA and obtain our main axiomatization results for the case of 1-provability. We obtain the relativization of these results to the case of n-provability for n > 1 in Section 6. In Section 7 we prove that the natural axiomatization of C 1 EA (EA) has superexponential speed-up over the axiomatization EA + Rfn(EA) and obtain related results for provable n-provability.
The question studied in this paper emerged in discussions with Volodya Shavrukov and was suggested by some (unpublished) results of Mingzhong Cai [7] (cf. Proposition 3.1 in this paper). We are grateful for their valuable input.
Preliminaries
In this paper we deal with first-order theories in the language of arithmetic. As a basic theory we take Elementary Arithmetic EA (sometimes denoted as I∆ 0 (exp)), that is, the first-order theory formulated in the language 0, (·) ′ , +, × extended by the unary function symbol exp for the exponentiation function 2
x . It has standard defining axioms for these symbols and the induction schema for all bounded formulas in this language. As usual, ϕ is a bounded formula if it contains only bounded quantifiers. The class of all bounded formulas in the language introduced above is denoted by ∆ 0 (exp), and we also call such formulas elementary. We denote by EA + the extension of EA by the axiom asserting the totality of the superexponential function 2 x y . If we allow induction for all arithmetical formulas the resulting theory is Peano Arithmetic denoted by PA. The fragment of PA obtained by restricting the induction schema to Σ n -formulas is denoted by IΣ n . By IΣ − n we denote the theory of parameter free induction for Σ n -formulas. It is clear that the sequence of theories {IΣ n | n < ω} is monotone and PA = n<ω IΣ n . We also consider the theories BΓ and LΓ and their parameter free versions BΓ − and LΓ − , where Γ is some class of arithmetical formulas (see, e.g., [11] ).
We assume the standard arithmetization of syntax and gödelnumbering of syntactic objects. In particular, we write ϕ for the (numeral of the) gödelnumber of ϕ. We consider r.e. extensions of EA and assume that each theory T comes with an elementary formula σ T (x), defining the set of axioms of T in the standard model. Using this formula one can naturally construct the formula Prf T (x, y) representing the relation "x codes a T -proof of the formula with gödelnumber y". Then the standard provability predicate for T is given by ∃x Prf T (x, y), and we denote this formula by ✷ T (y). We often write ✷ T ϕ instead of ✷ T ( ϕ ). Also we allow quantification over sentences or formulas in a natural way, e.g., ∀ϕ I(ϕ) is a shorthand for ∀x (Sent(x) → I(x)), where Sent(x) is an elementary formula defining the set of all gödelnumbers of the arithmetical sentences.
If every theorem of T is a theorem of U we write T ⊆ U . The formalization of this statement in arithmetic is given by ∀ψ (✷ T ψ → ✷ U ψ). By T ≡ U we mean that both inclusions T ⊆ U and U ⊆ T hold, that is, T and U are deductively equivalent. If the above conditions hold only for the formulas in some class Γ we write T ⊆ Γ U and T ≡ Γ U , respectively.
It is known that for n > 0 classes Π n have partial truth definitions. Namely, for each n > 0 there exists an arithmetical Π n -formula True Πn (x) such that for every Π n -formula ϕ(x 1 , . . . , x n )
where the bar notation ϕ(x) stands for the EA-definable term, representing the elementary function that maps n to ϕ(n) , wheren is the term 0 ′ ... ′ with n successor symbols. Using this formula we can formalize the notion of n-provability. We denote by [n] T the provability predicate for the theory T together with all true Π n -sentences taken as additional axioms. This predicate can be represented in arithmetic using the corresponding partial truth definition as follows:
It is known that [n] T satisfies Löb's derivability conditions provably in EA (cf [18, 5] ):
Point 3 follows from the general fact, known as provable Σ n+1 -completeness:
We write n T ϕ for ¬[n] T ¬ϕ. The formula n T ⊤ represents n-consistency of a theory T and is known to be equivalent to the uniform reflection principle for Σ n -formulas
The union of all schemata RFN Σn (T ) for n > 0, that is, the full uniform reflection schema, is denoted RFN(T ).
The local reflection principle for T is the following schema
If we impose the restriction ϕ ∈ Γ for some class of formulas Γ, then we obtain the partial reflection principle denoted by Rfn Γ (T ). Relativized local reflection principles are defined analogously, but with [n] T instead of ✷ T . For instance, Rfn n Γ (T ) denotes the schema
We say that (D, ≺) is an elementary linear ordering if there is a pair of elementary formulas D(x) and x ≺ y such that EA proves that (D, ≺) is a linear ordering. It is an elementary well-ordering, if ≺ is a well-ordering of {n ∈ N | N |= D(n)} in the standard model of arithmetic.
We consider transfinite iterations of the reflection schemata mentioned above along an arbitrary elementary well-ordering (D, ≺). We follow the treatment of iterated reflection principles presented in [3] . Assuming R(T ) is one of the reflection schemata for T a transfinite progression (R(T )) α∈D is defined by formalizing the following fixed-point equation:
More formally, let σ T (x) be an elementary numeration of a theory T . Fix an elementary formula Ax R (x, y) such that for each elementary formula τ (x) the formula Ax R (x, τ ) numerates the schema R(U ), where U is the theory numerated by τ . W.l.o.g. we may also assume that
Consider an elementary formula ρ(α, x) defined by the following fixed-point equation:
Note that β β ρ(β, x) , whence the quantifier for β can be bounded by x in view of condition (2) . The formula ρ(α, x) thus constructed numerates a parametrized family of theories that we denote R(T ) α and that provably satisfies equation (1) .
We write (T ) n α for RFN Σn (T ) α and T α for Con(T ) α , the αth member of the progression of iterated consistency assertions. The following lemma essentially due to Ulf Schmerl [16] provides a useful tool for reasoning about transfinite iterations inside weak theories such as EA. 
Using this lemma it can be shown that the sequence of theories (R(T ) α ) α∈D is unique modulo provable equivalence in EA. For more details on reflection principles and their transfinite iterations see [3] .
Provable n-provability
Given a natural number n > 0 and a pair of theories T and S, define the following set of formulas
Since [n] S satisfies Löb's derivability conditions, C n S (T ) is a deductively closed set extending S. Note that C n S (T ) can be viewed as a theory with the provability predicate
We start with several simple facts about the theories C n S (T ). The following basic result is due to Mingzhong Cai [7, Proposition 5.5] (unpublished), who considered the set of all formulas ϕ provably n-provable in a theory T for some n ∈ N, that is, the theory C ∞ T (T ) := n∈N C n T (T ). We include this result with a short direct proof.
. Now, RFN(T ) is equivalent to the theory axiomatized by { n T ⊤ | n ∈ N}. For each n we have
By provable Σ n+2 -completeness, since n T ⊤ is Π n+1 , we derive
. In this paper we study a more delicate question of characterizing the theories C n S (T ) for a fixed n > 0. As a first simple observation we show that such theories are not sensitive to the extension of T by axioms weaker than RFN Πn (S).
Proposition 3.2. For every sentence ψ and every
Proof. Note that (ii) follows from (i) by provable Σ n+1 -completeness. Indeed, since ¬π is Σ n+1 , we have T ⊢ ¬π → [n] S ¬π or, equivalently, T + n S π ⊢ π, and by the monotonicity of C n S (·) operator and (i) it yields
It is well-known by the results of D. Leivant [13] and H. Ono [14] that IΣ n ≡ EA + n + 1 EA ⊤ (cf also [3] ). Hence we obtain
The following lemma shows that the theories C n S (T ) are strictly stronger than S.
Proof. Arguing in EA assume S + Rfn n (S) ⊢ ϕ. We get a sequence of sentences ψ 1 , . . . , ψ n such that
If we show that for each i ∈ {1, . . . , n} it holds that
, then from the previous derivation we obtain EA ⊢ [n + 1] S ϕ and we get the required result since T is an extension of EA. We derive
It also answers the question concerning the axiomatization complexity of the theories C n S (T ). By the Unboundedness theorem of Kreisel and Lévy [12] (cf also [5, Corollary 2.22]) we obtain Corollary 3.6. For each n > 0 the theory C n S (T ) is of unbounded arithmetical complexity. In particular, it is not finitely axiomatized.
Provable in EA 1-provability
Recall that the operator C n S (·) is monotone w.r.t. the inclusion of theories and that we consider theories extending EA. So, the theory C 1 S (EA) is in some sense the base case for our investigations. In this section we characterize this theory in terms of the local reflection principle over S. For convenience we write C S (T ) for C 1 S (T ) throughout the paper.
Proof. The inclusion S + Rfn(S) ⊆ C S (EA) follows from Lemma 3.5. We focus on the converse inclusion. In this proof we will consider EA stated as a quantifier-free theory in the language with the terms for all elementary functions. Such a theory is known to be definitionally equivalent to the original formulation of EA (cf [3] ).
, where δ(x, z) is a bounded formula, be a Π 1 -formula that is EA-equivalent to True Π1 (z). By the definition of [1] S ϕ the assumption implies
We apply a version of Herbrand's theorem for Σ 2 -formulas (which can be formalized in EA + ) to the derivation above. Thus, we obtain a sequence of terms t 0 , p 0 ,
. . , x k ) such that the following disjunction is provable in EA:
with x 1 , x 2 , . . . , x k+1 as free variables. Our aim is to show that EA + Rfn(S) ⊢ ϕ. We do this by arguing informally in EA + Rfn(S) and considering cases corresponding to the disjunction above. Note that by provable Σ 1 -completeness for each EA-term t(x 1 , . . . , x k ) we have
This allows to replace occurrences of the form
For i ∈ {1, . . . , k + 1} let us denote by C i (x 1 , . . . , x i ) the following elementary formula
that is, the ith member of the disjunction above. We start with the first line by considering two cases: ∀x 1 C 1 (x 1 ) and ∃x 1 ¬C 1 (x 1 ). Assume ∀x 1 C 1 (x 1 ), then by the definition of C 1 (x 1 ) we have ∀x 1 δ(x 1 , t 0 ) and Prf S (p 0 , ∀x δ(x, t 0 ) → ϕ ). The latter formula clearly implies ✷ S (∀x δ(x, t 0 ) → ϕ). Since t 0 is a closed term we can use Rfn(S) to get ∀x δ(x, t 0 ) → ϕ, hence we obtain ϕ.
Conversely, assume ∃x 1 ¬C 1 (x 1 ). Using ∆ 0 (exp)-induction we can find the least element, denote it by c 1 , satisfying ¬C 1 (x). In other words, c 1 is the unique element satisfying the following elementary formula
. Also by its definition c 1 falsifies the first line of the disjuction. Now we substitute c 1 for x 1 in the disjunction above and consider two cases for the second line in the same way as for the first one. Namely, assume ∀x 2 C 2 (c 1 , x 2 ), that is, ∀x 2 δ(x 2 , t 1 (c 1 )) and Prf S (p 1 (c 1 ), ∀x δ(x, t 1 (c 1 )) → ϕ ). The second formula implies ✷ S (∀x δ(x, t 1 (c 1 )) → ϕ).
We want to show
Indeed, arguing in S:
Assume D 1 (y). By D 1 (c 1 ) and the uniqueness of c 1 we get y = c 1 . But then ∀x δ(x, t 1 (c 1 )) → ϕ implies ∀x δ(x, t 1 (y)) → ϕ, as required.
Using Rfn(S) from (4) we obtain ∀y (
, which, together with D 1 (c 1 ) and ∀x δ(x, t 1 (c 1 )) implies ϕ. Now, assume ∃x 2 ¬C 2 (c 1 , x 2 ). We proceed in the same way as above. Namely, by ∆ 0 (exp)-induction there exists the least x satisfying ¬C 2 (c 1 , x), denote it by c 2 . The pair (c 1 , c 2 ) satisfies the following elementary formula
and as above we have S ⊢ ∀x, y, z (D 2 (z, x)∧D 2 (z, y) → x = y). Together c 1 and c 2 falsify the first two lines of the disjunction. Also by provable
We continue considering two cases for each line of the disjunction. If ∀x i C i (c 1 , . . . , c i−1 , x i ), at first we eliminate the occurrences of c 1 , . . . , c i−1 under ✷ S by moving their elementary definitions under it as was done above. Then we apply Rfn(S), obtaining a sentence of the form
. , x i = c i respectively, and derive ϕ using hypotheses.
Conversely, if ∃x i ¬C i (c 1 , . . . , c i−1 , x i ), we define a new element c i as the least x satisfying ¬C i (c 1 , . . . , c i−1 , x), which, together with previously defined c 1 , . . . , c i−1 , falsifies the first i lines of the disjunction.
We proceed in this fashion by successively falsifying the lines. Since the whole disjunction is provable, it cannot be that all the lines are falsified, hence for some i ∈ {1, . . . , k + 1} it must be the case that ∀x i C i (c 1 , . . . , c i−1 , x i ). But in this case we derive ϕ, as required.
Provable 1-provability for extensions of EA
In this section we study the case of an arbitrary theory T and n = 1. The main result of the section is Theorem 1, which characterizes the theory C S (T ) in terms of a theory S and the Σ 0 2 -ordinal of a theory T .
We start by reducing the problem of axiomatizing C S (T ) for an arbitrary arithmetical theory T to the case of EA, which has been dealt with in the previous section. Note that since [1] S ϕ is a Σ 2 -formula, the theory C S (T ) depends only on the Σ 2 -consequences of T . Σ 2 -consequences of the fragments of PA were studied in [6] .
Let us define ω 0 := ω, ω n+1 := ω ωn for n < ω and ε 0 = sup{ω n | n < ω}. We fix some natural ordinal notation system for ordinals α < ε 0 and its presentation in arithmetic. Whenever we mention these ordinals in a formal context, we assume that this particular ordinal notation system is being used.
Assume an elementary well-ordering (D, ≺) is fixed. The Σ 0 2 -ordinal of a theory T was defined in [6] in terms of the iterations of the local Σ 2 -reflection schema over EA as follows: 
Theories IΣ n were shown in [6] to be regular w.r.t. the natural ordinal notation system for ε 0 .
Lemma 5.1. Σ 2 -consequences of IΣ n are axiomatized by Rfn Σ2 (EA) ωn for n > 0.
It follows that C S (IΣ n ) ≡ C S (Rfn Σ2 (EA) ωn ). But also by [3, Proposition 5.2] we have ∀α Rfn Σ2 (T ) α ≡ Σ2 Rfn(T ) α provably in EA, whence C S (IΣ n ) ≡ C S (Rfn(EA) ωn ). Therefore we now focus on characterizing theories of the form C S (Rfn(EA) α ).
The following lemma shows that transfinite iterations of the local reflection principle along an arbitrary elementary well-ordering (D, ≺) and the C S (·) operator can be permuted. This allows us to reduce the characterization of C S (Rfn(EA) α ) to that of C S (EA).
Proof. We give an informal argument by reflexive induction on α in EA. The case α = 0 is trivial, so we can assume α = 0. Denote Rfn(T ) α and Rfn(C S (T )) α by T α and U α respectively. We split the proof into two parts:
By the definition of U α and the formalized deduction theorem there exist sentences ψ 1 , . . . , ψ m and β ≺ α such that
By Σ 1 -completeness we have
The reflexive induction hypothesis for β can be rewritten as
This implies
We will show that for each i ∈ {1, . . . , m} we have
Combining it with the previous derivation, we get
S ϕ, as required. Fix some i ∈ {1, . . . , m}. Using the reflexive induction hypothesis we derive
But since ¬✷ U β ψ i is a Π 1 -sentence, we have
By the definition of T α and the formalized deduction theorem there exist sentences ψ 1 , . . . , ψ n and β ≺ α such that
Our aim is to show that for any subset I ⊆ {1, . . . , m} it holds that
whence U + Rfn(U β ) ⊢ ϕ follows by considering all 2 m cases, hence U α ⊢ ϕ, as required. Firstly, let us show that for any I ⊆ {1, . . . , m} we have
Indeed, for each i we have
, so by the premise of (7) we get
Using provable Σ 1 -completeness for [1] S we derive
that yields the conclusion of (7). Moreover, this argument can be formalized in EA, so for each subset I ⊆ {1, . . . , m} we have
Now, fix some I ⊆ {1, . . . , m}. For each i we have
Using this and (5) we derive
By Σ 1 -completeness this implies
We use (8) to obtain
By the reflexive induction hypothesis for β we have
Finally, this yields
and since
we obtain (6). Now we are ready to state and prove a general result characterizing the theory C S (T ) in terms of the Σ 0 2 -ordinal of T and iterated local reflection over S.
Proof. By the discussion preceding Lemma 5.2 and the hypothesis we have
Using Lemmas 4.1 and 5.2 we obtain the following chain of equivalences
Note that the equivalences stated in Lemmas 4.1 and 5.2 are provable in EA + . It follows that if the theory is Σ 0 2 -regular provably in EA + , then the conclusion of Theorem 1 is also provable in EA + . Now we obtain several corollaries characterizing the theories C S (T ) for various fragments of PA.
Proof. Due to the Lemma 5.1 we can apply Theorem 1 with α = ω n . We get the required result since 1 + ω n = ω n for n > 0. It can be seen that the proof of Lemma 5.1 can be formalized in EA + , whence the result about EA + -provability of the equivalence follows.
In particular, we answer the question concerning C 1 PA (PA) raised in the introduction.
Using well-known conservation results we can also characterize the theories C S (T ) for parameter free induction schemata.
Proof. By [3, Proposition 7.6] we have the following conservation results
Since n > 0, these three theories have the same Σ 2 -consequences, hence
The result now follows from Corollary 5.3.
The next corollary covers the exceptional case of the theory IΠ 
where the last equivalence is due to Theorem 1.
The following corollary shows how to compute the Π 0 1 -ordinal for the theories C EA (T ) from the Σ 0 2 -ordinal of T .
Proof. By [3, Proposition 6.2] we have ∀β Rfn(EA) β ≡ Π1 EA ω β . Applying Theorem 1 and this fact with β = 1 + α we get
Relativization
In this section we generalize the results obtained in previous sections to the notion of n-provability for n > 1. The results concerning Σ 2 -conservativity mentioned in the discussion before Lemma 5.2 have the corresponding relativizations to the case of Σ n+2 -formulas. In particular, by the results of [6] we have the following Rfn n (T ) α provably in EA. Since [n + 1]S ϕ is a Σ n+2 -formula, we obtain the analogous chain of equalities
These facts allow us to use the same line of the argument as in the previous sections. We focus on the theories of the form C n+1 S (Rfn n (EA)) and reduce their characterization to that of C n+1 S (EA). The following lemma is the relativized version of Lemma 5.2.
Proof. The proof is obtained by the straightforward relativization of the proof of Lemma 5.2 but with minor modifications. Namely, one need to show that the reflexive induction hypothesis implies its relativized versions:
We argue informally in EA. To prove (9) assume U β ⊢ π → ψ for some true Π n -sentence π. Then by the reflexive induction hypothesis
To prove (10) assume T β ⊢ π → [n+1] S ψ for some true Π n -sentence π. By Σ n+2 -completeness we have EA ⊢ ¬π → [n + 1] S ¬π. Both ψ and ¬π imply π → ψ and hence T β ⊢ [n + 1] S (π → ψ). By the reflexive induction hypothesis we then obtain U β ⊢ π → ψ.
We present two proofs of the relativized version of Lemma 4.1. Firstly, we give a modeltheoretic proof.
Proof. Assume EA ⊢ [n + 1] S ϕ for some ϕ. We will show that ϕ is true in every model of EA + Rfn n (S). Fix an arbitrary M |= EA + Rfn n (S) and note that M |= IΣ
, and also K n+1 (M ) |= EA, where K n+1 (M ) is the substructure of M consisting of all Σ n+1 -definable elements (without parameters).
Since
The formula above is Π n+1 ∧ Σ 1 and hence by
Fix some Σ n+1 -formula σ(x) defining a, that is, M |= ∃!x σ(x) ∧ σ(a). Assume σ(x) = ∃y π(x, y), where π(x, y) is Π n , and consider the following formula
where (z) 0 and (z) 1 are the components of the pair coded by z. By M |= ∃x σ(x) we obtain M |= ∃z π((z) 0 , (z) 1 ). But since π((z) 0 , (z) 1 ) is Π n we get M |= ∃z δ(z) by using LΠ − n (due to [11, Proposition 1.4 
]).
We fix some c ∈ M such that M |= δ(c) and note that, in particular, M |= π((c) 0 , (c) 1 ), and hence M |= σ((c) 0 ) by the definition of σ(x). But then M |= (c) 0 = a since σ(x) defines a. Thus, (11) can be rewritten as
In case n = 0 the formula δ(z) is bounded and we take γ(z) := δ(z). If n > 0 denote byδ(z) the following formula
where ¬π((y) 0 , (y) 1 ) is ∃u ψ(y, u) with ψ(u, y) in Π n−1 . This formula is seen to be EA-equivalent to some Σ n+1 -formula, that is, there exists γ(z) in Σ n+1 such that EA ⊢ ∀z (γ(z) ↔δ(z)). Using the corresponding collection axiom as in [11, Proposition 1.7] we obtain M |= ∀z (δ(z) ↔ δ(z)) and hence M |= ∀z (γ(z) ↔ δ(z)). In particular, M |= γ(c).
by provable Σ n+1 -completeness and hence M |= [n] S δ(c), because by logic we have EA ⊢ ∀z (δ(z) → δ(z)) and so EA ⊢ ∀z (γ(z) → δ(z)). Also by the definition of δ(z) we clearly have
Let us show that
Indeed, arguing under [n] S inside M assume δ(y). Since we also have δ(c), using (13) we conclude that y = c. But by (12) we have True Πn+1 ((c) 0 ) → ϕ and hence True Πn+1 ((y) 0 ) → ϕ, as required. We apply Rfn n (S) to (14) and obtain
In particular, we have M |= δ(c) → (True Πn+1 ((c) 0 ) → ϕ)). Combining it with (12) and M |= δ(c) we get M |= ϕ.
In order to have the result provable in EA + as in the case of 1-provability we also give a syntactic proof that can be formalized in EA + .
Lemma 6.4. Provably in EA
Proof. The proof is similar to that of Lemma 4.1 and is based on the application of Herbrand's theorem. In order to apply Herbrand's theorem we reduce the problem to the case of Σ 2 -formulas by adapting the method from [1, Theorem 4] . At first, let us consider the case n = 1. Assume
Let ∀x ∃y δ(x, y, z), where δ(x, y, z) is a bounded formula, be a Π 2 -formula that is EA-equivalent to True Π2 (z), then by the definition of [2] S we have Our aim is to eliminate the innermost existential quantifier by introducing a new function symbol to the language of EA. Let us consider the theory U obtained from EA g , where g is a new function symbol, by adding the following axiom ∀x ∀z x (∃y δ((z) 0 , y, (z) 1 ) → ∃y g(x) δ((z) 0 , y, (z) 1 ) ).
By [1, Lemma 9.4] there exists a non-relativizing interpretation (·) − of U in IΣ 1 that is identical on formulas in the language of EA. It follows that (provably in EA) U is conservative over IΣ 1 .
The existential quantifier in the formula ∃y δ(x, y, z) can be bounded in U using axiom (16) , and the function that gives the least witness for this quantifier is elementary in g. It follows that this function can be defined by some
Using (15) and (17) we get
Now, since U has Π g 1 -axiomatization and the formula above is Σ g 2 we are able to apply a version of Herbrand's theorem for Σ 2 -formulas. Let us denote by C(x, z, p) the following formula
By Herbrand's theorem we get a sequence of
. . , x k ) such that the following disjunction is provable in U :
with x 1 , x 2 , . . . , x k+1 as free variables.
By applying (17) , weakening Prf S to ✷ S and rewriting occurrences of terms t 0 , t 1 (x 1 ), . . . , t k (x 1 , . . . , x k ) using existential quantifiers we obtain
Let us consider the case k = 1. We apply the interpretation and obtain
Note that all (u i = t i (x 1 , . . . , x i )) − are equivalent to Σ 2 -formulas in IΣ 1 . By induction on the complexity of a EA g -term t(x 1 , . . . , x m ) using [1, Lemma 9.4] for the base case one can show
In particular, this holds for the formulas (u i = t i (x 1 , . . . , x i )) − .
Now we argue inside IΣ 1 + Rfn 1 (IΣ 1 + S) as in the proof of Lemma 4.1 by considering cases corresponding to the disjunction above.
Fix some witness u 0 to the first existential quantifier and start from the first line. In case ¬((u 0 = t 0 ) − ∧ ✷ S (∀x ∃y δ(x, y, u 0 ) → ϕ)) the first line is falsified by any x 1 , so we fix x 1 =0 and move to the second line. Note that we are happen to be in the same position as for the first line, and we can apply the same reasoning.
So assume (u 0 = t 0 ) − ∧ ✷ S (∀x ∃y δ(x, y, u 0 ) → ϕ). In this case we also consider two possibilities. Suppose ∀x 1 ∃y δ(x 1 , y, u 0 ). By provable Σ 2 -completeness we get [1] IΣ1+S (u 0 = t 0 )
− . Also by the assumption we have ✷ S (∀x ∃y δ(x, y, u 0 ) → ϕ).
We (18) we get v 0 = u 0 , whence ∀x ∃y δ(x, y, v 0 ) → ϕ since ∀x ∃y δ(x, y, u 0 ) → ϕ.
. By taking v 0 = u 0 and using hypotheses we obtain ϕ.
Conversely, assume ∃x 1 ∀y ¬δ(x 1 , y, u 0 ). Let B(u 0 , x 1 ) be the formula asserting that x 1 is the least element satisfying ∀y ¬δ(x 1 , y, u 0 ). Using LΠ 1 we find such x 1 and denote it by c 1 . Note that B(u 0 , x 1 ) is of the form Π 1 ∧ ∀ b Σ 1 , hence it is IΣ 1 -equivalent to Σ 2 -formula by using BΣ 1 . Also we clearly have
The elements u 0 and c 1 together falsify the first line. We fix them and move to the second line. Fix a witness u 1 for the second existential quantifier (with x 1 replaced by c 1 ). In our case (k = 1) it must be that
Using provable Σ 2 -completeness we obtain
We argue under [1] IΣ1+S as follows:
The first hypothesis implies v 0 = u 0 , whence the second hypothesis implies d 1 = c 1 , so v 1 = u 1 by the third hypothesis. By the assumption (19) we get ∀x ∃y δ(x, y, v 1 ) → ϕ.
and applying the hypotheses we derive ϕ. The proof for k > 1 is no different. It goes along the same lines as the proof of Lemma 4.1 but with the appropriate modifications as it was done above for the case k = 1.
Finally, since IΣ 1 is finitely axiomatizable we have IΣ 1 + Rfn 1 (S) ⊢ Rfn 1 (IΣ 1 + S). Indeed, denote by ψ the conjunction of all axioms of IΣ 1 . By the formalized deduction theorem we get
and we obtain
A proof for an arbitrary n > 1 is essentially the same, but now we use [1, Lemma 9.6] and [1, Lemma 9.7 ] to get the interpretation (·) − and to show that True Πn+1 (z) is equivalent to some Π g1,...,gn 1 -formula. The formulas (u i = t i (x 1 , . . . , x i ))
− are equivalent to Σ n+1 -formulas in IΣ n and hence we get [n] IΣn+S instead of [1] IΣ1+S in the last part of the argument because we apply provable Σ n+1 -completeness instead of Σ 2 -completeness.
Note that, while Lemmas 3.5 and 6.3 give the equivalence C n+1 S (EA) ≡ S + Rfn n (S) for all S extending EA, in order to have it provable in EA + we need S to be as strong as IΣ n due to the Lemma 6.4. Hence we get the following analog of Lemma 4.1. (IΣ m ) ≡ Rfn(S) ωm−n .
We also obtain the analogues of Corollaries 5.5 and 5.6. 
Speed-up results
Theorem 1 implies that the theories C EA (EA) and EA + Rfn(EA) are deductively equivalent and this equivalence is provable in EA + . In this section we prove a speed-up result, which shows that it is in some sense easier to prove 1-provability of a formula in EA rather than to find a proof of this formula in EA + Rfn(EA).
Namely, we show that C EA (EA) has superexponential speed-up over EA + Rfn(EA), that is, there is a sequence of sentences ϕ n , a polynomial p(n) and a constant ε > 0 such that for each n there is an EA-proof of [1] EA ϕ n of size p(n) and there is no EA + Rfn(EA)-proof of ϕ n of size less than (2 1 n ) ε . In particular, there is no elementary function f (x) such that f (p) codes an EA + Rfn(EA)-proof of ϕ, whenever p codes an EA-proof of [1] EA ϕ for some ϕ.
Our strategy to obtain the result is reflected in the following schema.
The following two lemmas show that the vertical equivalences in the above schema are provable in EA. Moreover, they produce the functions effecting the proof-transformation.
Conversely, assume EA ⊢ [1] EA π for some Π 1 -sentence π. We derive
For a proof of the next lemma we refer to [3, Proposition 6.1].
It follows from the proof of Lemma 7.1 that there is a polynomially bounded function f 1 (x) that, given an EA + -proof p of a Π 1 -sentence π, transforms it into an EA-proof f (p) of [1] EA π. Similarly, there is an elementary function f 2 (x) that acts the same relative to the pair of theories EA + Rfn(EA) and EA ω . The following lemma shows that there is no such an elementary function for the pair of theories EA + and EA ω . Proof. We will show that EA + proves the consistency of EA ω on some cut in EA + , whence the result follows by mimicking the proof of [15, Theorem 4.2] . Namely, one can take ϕ n := Con EA ω (2 1 n ), where Con EA ω (x) is the formalization of "there is no EA ω -proof of contradiction of size x".
Define the formula J(x) := Con(EA x ). We claim that J(x) is the required cut in EA + . Indeed, EA + ⊢ J(0) ∧ ∀y x (J(x) → J(y)) is trivial. Now we show that EA + ⊢ ∀x (J(x) → J(x + 1)).
Using the fact that EA x+1 ≡ EA + Con(EA x ) and EA + ≡ EA + 1 EA ⊤, we derive
that is, EA + ⊢ ¬J(x + 1) → ¬J(x), whence EA + ⊢ J(x) → J(x + 1). Furthermore, we have EA ⊢ ∀x (J(x) → Con EAω (x)).
Reasoning in EA assume that some y x codes an EA ω -proof of a contradiction. By the definition of EA ω the number y must code a proof of contradiction in EA z+1 for some z (namely, the maximal number k such that the axiom Con(EA k ) is used in the proof coded by y). In particular, EA z+1 is inconsistent. By the definition of z the proof coded by y should contain the axiom Con(EA z ), and since z z Con(EAz) we have z < y x. In this case the inconsistency of EA z+1 implies the inconsistency of EA x , whence ¬Con(EA x ), that is, ¬J(x).
Theorem 3. C EA (EA) has superexponential speed-up over EA + Rfn(EA).
Proof. By Lemma 7.3 there is a sequence of bounded sentences ϕ n with short EA + -proofs and long EA ω -proofs in a sense of the definition of speed-up. We claim that this sequence also witnesses the superexponential speed-up of C EA (EA) over EA+Rfn(EA), since the functions f 1 (x) and f 2 (x) preserve the bounds from the definition of speed-up.
Indeed, the sentences ϕ n have short C EA (EA)-proofs by transforming their short EA + -proofs via f 1 (x), which is polynomially bounded. However, if there were short proofs of these sentences in EA+Rfn(EA) then we could transform them via the function f 2 (x), which is multiexponentially bounded, into short EA ω -proofs, contradicting Lemma 7.3.
We also prove the generalizations of the previous results. Proof. Essentially the same as that of Lemma 7.3, but with J(x) := n-Con((EA) n x ) and using that IΣ n ≡ EA + n + 1 EA ⊤. Proof. The proof is the same as that of Theorem 3 by using the previous lemmas. Indeed, for the inclusion IΣ n ⊆ Π1 C EA (IΣ n ) it follows from Lemma 7.4, for Rfn(EA) ωn ⊆ Π1 EA ωn+1 it follows from Lemma 7.5. As for the rest, it can be seen from the proof of [3, Theorem 3] that the corresponding inclusions can be proved in EA. It follows that there are corresponding elementary, hence multiexponentially bounded, functions effecting the proof transformation and for the first inclusion we obtain a polynomially bounded function from the proof of Lemma 7.4. The rest of the proof is exactly the same as in Theorem 3, but now using Lemma 7.6.
